As you are aware, civil protests in Egypt against Mubarak and his regime have reached unprecedented levels in the past few days. Mubarak’ efforts to satisfy the crowds – first by reshuffling his cabinet and second by appointing a vice president – have only provoked stronger calls for Mubarak to step down. The feared police forces have abandoned the streets and it seems Mubarak is willing to allow the country to descend into chaos before relinquishing control. Egypt appears to be on the cusp of a long sought regime change and more open democratic practices.
All of these remarkable developments come on the heels of the ousting of the authoritative Tunisian government earlier this month and raise the question of whether the revolutionary spirit will continue to spread in the Middle East. Analysts are paying particular attention to Yemen, the poorest Arab nation fraught with political, economic and security problems run by a man who has held power longer than Mubarak (President Saleh took power in 1979, two years before Mubarak). Media sources are reporting protests in Sana’a and other revolutionary stirrings on the streets of Yemen but, is Yemen next?
Yemenis are talking. The examples of Tunisia and Egypt have people wondering if Yemen will follow in their footsteps. There are certainly enough internal forces working against Yemeni stability. To briefly describe them:
1.The Houthi Rebellion - The recurring Houthi rebellion in the northern province of Sa’ada has financially and militariliy taxed the central government and demonstrated that it does not have the capacity to control one armed uprising, much less multiple insurrections. The initial causes for the conflict have been lost in years of compounding conflict and tribal intervention transforming a regional conflict into a conflict with the potential capacity to threaten central government stability.
2.AQAP – Yemen is a safe haven for Al-Qaeda elements and the state’s unwillingness or inability to control and counteract their presence threatens both internal stability and international security. AQAP tries to endear itself to the local population by trying to align its message with local grievances but in reality, its goals are distinct from that of other forces like the Southern Movement.
3.The Southern Movement – A secessionist movement in southern Yemen that is seeking to break away from northern Yemen and reestablish South Yemen or South Arabia. Yemen was two countries prior to unification in 1990. Southerners complain of economic and social inequality between the north and south and frustrated with the north’s empty promises for resource and power sharing following unification and a brief civil war in 1994.
I could continue as the list goes on: lack of central government presence outside major cities (a majority of the population lives in the country side), a rapidly growing population (expected to double by 2050), dwindling water and oil resources (Sana’a is projected to be the first capital to run out of water in 2017), and high unemployment (35% of the population is unemployed – near the unemployment level during the US Great Depression).
The outlook is grim. But does this all add up to revolution or regime change? Egyptians had a litany repressed grievances for years that did not turn their grievances into open protest until the trigger of the Tunisian revolution. It is yet to be seen if the revolutionary momentum will carry over to Yemen on the same scale. Yemen is also missing a factor present among young people in Tunisia and Egypt – social networking. Facebook and Twitter played a crucial role in mobilizing the masses in Tunisian and to a lesser extent in Egypt as well. Compared with Tunisia and Egypt, few Yemenis are internet savvy and fewer are utilizing those social network tools.
Finally, the big question on the mind of Yemenis is if Saleh falls, who takes his place? Does Yemen risk over turning the system with no viable alternative? While this concern may give Yemenis pause on an individual level, could it hold up a mass uprising against the government? Saleh, like Mubarak, has positioned himself such that his ouster would cause chaos in the system. A collapse of central control in Yemen, however, would unleash the rebellions described above that are already thriving with a government presence. Also, the unrest in Egypt has so far been characterized by the lack of violence against foreigners. Would that be true for Yemen?
You will notice I have posed more questions in this post than I attempt to answer. The confluence of forces and factors that lead to collective civil action and protest are complicated and difficult to measure and predict.
My corner of Yemen has been quiet so far.
