It's warming up. I mean, literally, the weather starting to be hot again. I was really hoping the Yemeni winter would stay a couple more months but the spring/summer/fall monster of heat and humidity is moving back in. Alas.
Being more pensive and metaphorical for a moment, here are where things stand in Yemen's political arena and thoughts on what could be coming. The protests last Thursday did not make the big waves Western observers were expecting. As you might have read, Yemen opposition parties called for protests last Thursday against the government. Protests occurred in the big cities but were moderate in size, peaceful, and dispersed before lunch. In Sana'a, a sizable crowd gathered for a pro-government rally in Sana'a's Liberation Square calling for reform but not for regime change. Rumor has it that those protesters received 2000 YR for their morning of shouting and cheering. That's good money for a half day of work in Yemen.
The opposition has vowed to protest every Thursday until those demands are met. it is not clear whether these protests will be more intense or longer than those last Thursday. Local threat analysts say the likelihood of Yemen being the next Egypt are low right now but note that if Yemen was to experience wide spread protests, they would likely be violent given the country is awash in firearms.
Gregory Johnson, a professor at Princeton University, keeps a insightful blog on Yemen called Waq al-Waq. I encourage you to read his posts. You will find a link to his blog on the right of this blog. I enjoy sharing my attempts at political analysis with you but encourage you to read his posts for a more informed perspective.
He writes in his post recent post that he thinks Yemen will be in trouble if two things happen: 1. Mubarak falls in Egypt and 2. Yemenis take to the street outside the control of political parties in popular protests. Some analysts after last Thursdays largely quiet day of rage concluded Yemen will not follow the path of Tunisia and Egypt. Johnson instead, noting that Yemen has historically been the caboose of the Arab political fashion train, urges patience in forecasting Yemen's future.
As for the weather, it's getting warmer.
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Saturday, February 5, 2011
Join the Flour Revolution. It's the yeast you can do
A man taking part in anti-government protests in Sana'a. It is not clear if the bread and roll are for protection or a mid-protest snack.
From here
Courtesy of NG
Thursday, February 3, 2011
The Cost of Stability
The Yemen 'Day of Rage' has been quite in my corner of the country and though the protests in Sana'a were large, they were peaceful. That is good.
According to the BBC, over 20,000 people gathered at an anti-government rally in Sana'a. That is the largest crowd ever to gather in opposition to the current president.
The NY Times also reports that a sizable pro-government rally was organized by the president and his party. The pro-government rally called for political change but not for the president's removal, believing only he could ensure the country's stability.
The president, in addition to announcing Wednesday that he nor his son will run for office in 2013, has promised to raise civil servant and military wages, impose price controls on critical goods, establish a fund to employ university graduates, extend social security and reduce income taxes. He also promised to reform the election process in advance of April's parliamentary elections.
Let's focus on his economic and financial promises. While in the short run these promises may defuse the economic motivations for political action against the president, in the long run, they exacerbate Yemen's financial problem. The government of Yemen relies on oil for a majority of its revenue but due to low global oil prices, a corrupt system that syphons money off at several points (I suspect. I can not prove that) and dwindling reserves, the Yemeni government is barreling (like that pun?) toward the day when it can no longer sustain the welfare and clientelism system that maintains state stability. When the government, in particular the president, can no long offer handouts and favors, it will lose its control over the tribal and local leaders it has absorbed into the system and thus its ability to provide stability. Loyalty you buy is only good when you can pay for it.
Adding further financial strain to the system to achieve an ephemeral political victory does not help Yemen.
According to the BBC, over 20,000 people gathered at an anti-government rally in Sana'a. That is the largest crowd ever to gather in opposition to the current president.
The NY Times also reports that a sizable pro-government rally was organized by the president and his party. The pro-government rally called for political change but not for the president's removal, believing only he could ensure the country's stability.
The president, in addition to announcing Wednesday that he nor his son will run for office in 2013, has promised to raise civil servant and military wages, impose price controls on critical goods, establish a fund to employ university graduates, extend social security and reduce income taxes. He also promised to reform the election process in advance of April's parliamentary elections.
Let's focus on his economic and financial promises. While in the short run these promises may defuse the economic motivations for political action against the president, in the long run, they exacerbate Yemen's financial problem. The government of Yemen relies on oil for a majority of its revenue but due to low global oil prices, a corrupt system that syphons money off at several points (I suspect. I can not prove that) and dwindling reserves, the Yemeni government is barreling (like that pun?) toward the day when it can no longer sustain the welfare and clientelism system that maintains state stability. When the government, in particular the president, can no long offer handouts and favors, it will lose its control over the tribal and local leaders it has absorbed into the system and thus its ability to provide stability. Loyalty you buy is only good when you can pay for it.
Adding further financial strain to the system to achieve an ephemeral political victory does not help Yemen.
Wednesday, February 2, 2011
President vows to not seek reelection
The President of Yemen vowed not to extend his presidency, which ends in 2013, or pass power to his son. This promise comes in advance of protests against his rule scheduled for Thursday, Yemen's Day of Anger. See BBC article
The unrest in Tunisia and Egypt and thinning of the Arab autocrat club clearly got his attention. The King of Jordan, similarly making concessions before crowds and demands grew to be unmanageable, dismissed his cabinet and promised more democratic processes. While superficially the Yemeni president has made a big promise, he already made that promise to his people twice and well, he's still president.
Will the opposition or the people trust him this time? Are they satisfied waiting until 2013? The 2013 elections are two years away giving him plenty of time to entrench himself in power further. Saleh is a survivor and I believe his present actions must be viewed through that lens. The opposition welcomed his statement but said they await more concrete steps to that end and that the protests will go forward tomorrow as planned, peaceful and orderly.
The unrest in Tunisia and Egypt and thinning of the Arab autocrat club clearly got his attention. The King of Jordan, similarly making concessions before crowds and demands grew to be unmanageable, dismissed his cabinet and promised more democratic processes. While superficially the Yemeni president has made a big promise, he already made that promise to his people twice and well, he's still president.
Will the opposition or the people trust him this time? Are they satisfied waiting until 2013? The 2013 elections are two years away giving him plenty of time to entrench himself in power further. Saleh is a survivor and I believe his present actions must be viewed through that lens. The opposition welcomed his statement but said they await more concrete steps to that end and that the protests will go forward tomorrow as planned, peaceful and orderly.
Monday, January 31, 2011
Feb. 3rd.: Yemen's Day of Anger
The opposition coalition has declared February 3rd to be Yemen's Day of Anger calling for Yemenis to take to the streets and protest against government rule. Egypt's Day of Anger, January 25th, sparked the current popular uprising that threatens to unseat long time president Hosni Mubarak.
The opposition leaders made the calls for protests following a refusal by the General People's Congress (GPC) to convene the National Dialogue Committee. The National Dialogue Committee is composed of the President, vice President and two leaders of the opposition party and is a forum for addressing the political grievances and imbalances in the current system. In particular, the opposition coalition, or Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), is unhappy with a current proposed constitutional amendment that would remove term limits allowing the president to run for office again.
Courtesy of the Yemen Times: LINK
That's the word from the top. I don't know what the average Yemeni knows or cares about opposition declaration. I will write more as I learn more.
The opposition leaders made the calls for protests following a refusal by the General People's Congress (GPC) to convene the National Dialogue Committee. The National Dialogue Committee is composed of the President, vice President and two leaders of the opposition party and is a forum for addressing the political grievances and imbalances in the current system. In particular, the opposition coalition, or Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), is unhappy with a current proposed constitutional amendment that would remove term limits allowing the president to run for office again.
“These amendments came to serve the authorities, not the country and the people. Therefore the people went out on these public demonstrations to express that they are fed up with the political situation,” said No’man. “The question now is: is this regime in a situation that allows it to make any social, economic or security improvements?”
Courtesy of the Yemen Times: LINK
That's the word from the top. I don't know what the average Yemeni knows or cares about opposition declaration. I will write more as I learn more.
Sunday, January 30, 2011
Is Yemen next?
As you are aware, civil protests in Egypt against Mubarak and his regime have reached unprecedented levels in the past few days. Mubarak’ efforts to satisfy the crowds – first by reshuffling his cabinet and second by appointing a vice president – have only provoked stronger calls for Mubarak to step down. The feared police forces have abandoned the streets and it seems Mubarak is willing to allow the country to descend into chaos before relinquishing control. Egypt appears to be on the cusp of a long sought regime change and more open democratic practices.
All of these remarkable developments come on the heels of the ousting of the authoritative Tunisian government earlier this month and raise the question of whether the revolutionary spirit will continue to spread in the Middle East. Analysts are paying particular attention to Yemen, the poorest Arab nation fraught with political, economic and security problems run by a man who has held power longer than Mubarak (President Saleh took power in 1979, two years before Mubarak). Media sources are reporting protests in Sana’a and other revolutionary stirrings on the streets of Yemen but, is Yemen next?
Yemenis are talking. The examples of Tunisia and Egypt have people wondering if Yemen will follow in their footsteps. There are certainly enough internal forces working against Yemeni stability. To briefly describe them:
1.The Houthi Rebellion - The recurring Houthi rebellion in the northern province of Sa’ada has financially and militariliy taxed the central government and demonstrated that it does not have the capacity to control one armed uprising, much less multiple insurrections. The initial causes for the conflict have been lost in years of compounding conflict and tribal intervention transforming a regional conflict into a conflict with the potential capacity to threaten central government stability.
2.AQAP – Yemen is a safe haven for Al-Qaeda elements and the state’s unwillingness or inability to control and counteract their presence threatens both internal stability and international security. AQAP tries to endear itself to the local population by trying to align its message with local grievances but in reality, its goals are distinct from that of other forces like the Southern Movement.
3.The Southern Movement – A secessionist movement in southern Yemen that is seeking to break away from northern Yemen and reestablish South Yemen or South Arabia. Yemen was two countries prior to unification in 1990. Southerners complain of economic and social inequality between the north and south and frustrated with the north’s empty promises for resource and power sharing following unification and a brief civil war in 1994.
I could continue as the list goes on: lack of central government presence outside major cities (a majority of the population lives in the country side), a rapidly growing population (expected to double by 2050), dwindling water and oil resources (Sana’a is projected to be the first capital to run out of water in 2017), and high unemployment (35% of the population is unemployed – near the unemployment level during the US Great Depression).
The outlook is grim. But does this all add up to revolution or regime change? Egyptians had a litany repressed grievances for years that did not turn their grievances into open protest until the trigger of the Tunisian revolution. It is yet to be seen if the revolutionary momentum will carry over to Yemen on the same scale. Yemen is also missing a factor present among young people in Tunisia and Egypt – social networking. Facebook and Twitter played a crucial role in mobilizing the masses in Tunisian and to a lesser extent in Egypt as well. Compared with Tunisia and Egypt, few Yemenis are internet savvy and fewer are utilizing those social network tools.
Finally, the big question on the mind of Yemenis is if Saleh falls, who takes his place? Does Yemen risk over turning the system with no viable alternative? While this concern may give Yemenis pause on an individual level, could it hold up a mass uprising against the government? Saleh, like Mubarak, has positioned himself such that his ouster would cause chaos in the system. A collapse of central control in Yemen, however, would unleash the rebellions described above that are already thriving with a government presence. Also, the unrest in Egypt has so far been characterized by the lack of violence against foreigners. Would that be true for Yemen?
You will notice I have posed more questions in this post than I attempt to answer. The confluence of forces and factors that lead to collective civil action and protest are complicated and difficult to measure and predict.
My corner of Yemen has been quiet so far.
All of these remarkable developments come on the heels of the ousting of the authoritative Tunisian government earlier this month and raise the question of whether the revolutionary spirit will continue to spread in the Middle East. Analysts are paying particular attention to Yemen, the poorest Arab nation fraught with political, economic and security problems run by a man who has held power longer than Mubarak (President Saleh took power in 1979, two years before Mubarak). Media sources are reporting protests in Sana’a and other revolutionary stirrings on the streets of Yemen but, is Yemen next?
Yemenis are talking. The examples of Tunisia and Egypt have people wondering if Yemen will follow in their footsteps. There are certainly enough internal forces working against Yemeni stability. To briefly describe them:
1.The Houthi Rebellion - The recurring Houthi rebellion in the northern province of Sa’ada has financially and militariliy taxed the central government and demonstrated that it does not have the capacity to control one armed uprising, much less multiple insurrections. The initial causes for the conflict have been lost in years of compounding conflict and tribal intervention transforming a regional conflict into a conflict with the potential capacity to threaten central government stability.
2.AQAP – Yemen is a safe haven for Al-Qaeda elements and the state’s unwillingness or inability to control and counteract their presence threatens both internal stability and international security. AQAP tries to endear itself to the local population by trying to align its message with local grievances but in reality, its goals are distinct from that of other forces like the Southern Movement.
3.The Southern Movement – A secessionist movement in southern Yemen that is seeking to break away from northern Yemen and reestablish South Yemen or South Arabia. Yemen was two countries prior to unification in 1990. Southerners complain of economic and social inequality between the north and south and frustrated with the north’s empty promises for resource and power sharing following unification and a brief civil war in 1994.
I could continue as the list goes on: lack of central government presence outside major cities (a majority of the population lives in the country side), a rapidly growing population (expected to double by 2050), dwindling water and oil resources (Sana’a is projected to be the first capital to run out of water in 2017), and high unemployment (35% of the population is unemployed – near the unemployment level during the US Great Depression).
The outlook is grim. But does this all add up to revolution or regime change? Egyptians had a litany repressed grievances for years that did not turn their grievances into open protest until the trigger of the Tunisian revolution. It is yet to be seen if the revolutionary momentum will carry over to Yemen on the same scale. Yemen is also missing a factor present among young people in Tunisia and Egypt – social networking. Facebook and Twitter played a crucial role in mobilizing the masses in Tunisian and to a lesser extent in Egypt as well. Compared with Tunisia and Egypt, few Yemenis are internet savvy and fewer are utilizing those social network tools.
Finally, the big question on the mind of Yemenis is if Saleh falls, who takes his place? Does Yemen risk over turning the system with no viable alternative? While this concern may give Yemenis pause on an individual level, could it hold up a mass uprising against the government? Saleh, like Mubarak, has positioned himself such that his ouster would cause chaos in the system. A collapse of central control in Yemen, however, would unleash the rebellions described above that are already thriving with a government presence. Also, the unrest in Egypt has so far been characterized by the lack of violence against foreigners. Would that be true for Yemen?
You will notice I have posed more questions in this post than I attempt to answer. The confluence of forces and factors that lead to collective civil action and protest are complicated and difficult to measure and predict.
My corner of Yemen has been quiet so far.
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
I thought we were friends
Hilary Clinton visited Yemen today and did not call or even tell me she was coming. I'm trying not to be offended. Hil, I get that you're busy but if you're traveling all this way the least you can do is say hi.
A Times article has more: here
Take a close look at the picture at the top of the article. Unless Hilary is wearing heels (not comfortable traveling shoes by the way. Not that I know that from experience), she is legitimately taller than Saleh, the Yemeni president.
A Times article has more: here
Take a close look at the picture at the top of the article. Unless Hilary is wearing heels (not comfortable traveling shoes by the way. Not that I know that from experience), she is legitimately taller than Saleh, the Yemeni president.
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